

DISARMAMENT

Newsletter

Newsletter issued by
the United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs
Volume 10, Number 4
August/September 1992



United Nations

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The cover photograph shows United Nations peace-keeping troops arriving in Western Sahara.

(UN photo 158983)

Information published by the Office for Disarmament Affairs may be requested from Room S-3151, United Nations, New York, NY 10017; or from the Geneva Branch, ODA, Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, Switzerland; the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, B.P. 2705, Lomé, Togo; the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mcal. Blas Cerdeña 450, San Isidro, Lima, Perú; or the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, P.O. Box 107 Pulchowk, Kathmandu, Nepal.

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Vol. 10 No.4

The Disarmament Newsletter is published by the United Nations

Conference on Disarmament adopts CWC

On 3 September, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) adopted the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons containing a draft chemical weapons convention, and agreed by consensus to send it to the General Assembly.

As drafted, each State party to the convention undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; nor to use chemical weapons or engage in military preparations for their use.

"Each State party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control," as provided by the convention. Furthermore, each State party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State party and to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

The CD decision of 3 September followed 32 meetings of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons from 24 January to 26 August.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons stressed the overall balance of rights and obligations, benefits and costs, stating that:

- The text's comprehensive obligations ban all conceivable actions in contravention to the treaty purpose, enhancing the security of all because they are absolutely non-discriminatory. Where basic obligations would not be respected, safeguards

were built into the convention through provisions for assistance and protection against chemical weapons and measures to ensure compliance.

- The text provides equilibrium between credible verification and the protection of national security interests.
- The verification regime for the chemical industry offers a delicate equilibrium between the interests of industrial States which would have to bear the bulk of verification and those of developing States whose interest in increased cooperation was recognized.
- The composition of the Executive Council tries to balance the interests of different regions, north-south and east-west politically, and also gives developing countries majority representation while industrialized countries have the balancing benefit of industrial seats.
- While possessors of chemical weapons are obliged to destroy their chemical weapons and CW production facilities within ten years, the text contains provisions for a limited extension period, should they, in exceptional cases, for technological, financial or ecological reasons, not be able to do so.
- While States parties had to make declarations and accept challenge inspections, multilaterally, they gained in security and in prospects for free trade in chemical products.

During the consideration of the draft convention, some delegations expressed positions for inclusion in the report.

The United States considered that, on balance, the draft convention was acceptable. Although it did not contain some preferred US positions, the United States was prepared to go ahead and sign.

Mexico welcomed the fact that the CD had a draft convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. It had reached the conclusion that the draft should be approved since delay could lead to unforeseen consequences.

China identified elements, which it viewed as drawbacks, concerning the number of chemical industry facilities subject to verification, the emphasis placed on intrusive, short-notice challenge inspection and the provisions on extension of the CW destruction period.

The delegation of the Russian Federation said the text rested on compromises, not all of which were fully acceptable. Nonetheless, Russia would overlook drawbacks, except it requested clarifications concerning the costs of destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities, and the definition of certain specialized equipment referred to in the Annex on Implementation and Verification.

The delegation of Argentina, speaking also on behalf of the delegation of Brazil, said it considered the draft to be an auspicious outcome of a complex negotiating process striking a delicate and favourable balance between security requirements and the legitimate concerns of the chemical industry. Its innovative verification arrangements would mark a watershed in the history of multilateral disarmament.

France stated that the chemical weapons convention would entail substantial progress for international security and was the first multilateral disarmament agreement with effective verification provisions banning a whole class of weapons of mass destruction.



Destroyed DB-2 bombs designed for use as mustard gas bombs
(UN Photo 158589 / H. Ardrisson)

France said there was no realistic possibility of producing a better text through further negotiations. The Chairman's report states that this position was shared by the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire.

During the consideration of the draft text, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee explained some of its provisions:

- The definition of chemical weapons was formulated broadly to cover not only toxic chemicals and their precursors, but also specifically-designed means of delivery.
- The criteria for membership in the Executive Council of the Organization were intended to ensure membership that would be broadly representative of the membership of the treaty.
- The text foresaw having a request for challenge inspections, including information on the location of the inspection site, transmitted to the inspected State party not less than twelve hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. This was not intended to make it difficult for the inspected party to fulfil its obligations, but related to the over-all time span between notification and arrival at the site to be inspected.

Not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force for it, each State party is to declare

whether it has any chemical weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction, and specify the precise location and quantity. It is then to provide a general plan for the destruction of these weapons.

Declarations are also required regarding chemical weapons production facilities, specifying where they are and whether a party had transferred or received any equipment for the production of chemical weapons.

All locations at which chemical weapons are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection.

All States parties to the convention shall be members of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The seat of the headquarters of the Organization shall be The Hague, Netherlands.

The costs of the Organization's activities shall be paid by States parties in accordance with the UN scale of assessment adjusted for the difference in membership.

The Conference, which is to meet in regular sessions, shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting, and decisions on matters of substance by consensus, as far as possible. If consensus cannot be reached, after a 24-hour deferment, the Conference shall take the decision, by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.

France accedes to NPT

On 3 August 1992, France became the fifth of the five declared nuclear-weapon States to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970.

During 1991, the number of parties increased from 141 to 147 with the accession of Latvia, Lithuania, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

During the first half of 1992, two additional parties acceded: China and Estonia. The total number of parties thus becomes 150 with the accession of France.

Kazakhstan plans non-nuclear security

Having agreed on 19 May to give up the strategic nuclear weapons which were deployed on its territory, Kazakhstan has planned a conference on the problems and challenges it will face as an independent non-nuclear-weapon State.

The conference will be held in the Kazakh capital of Alma Ata in October 1992. It has been estimated that there are 104 10-warhead SS-18 missiles deployed at two bases in Kazakhstan.

Following the Chinese nuclear test in northwestern China of 21 May, Kazakhstan has made particular efforts to obtain security assurances for itself as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

Guidelines on weapons of mass destruction

On 29 May 1992, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA declared that they would observe and consult with each other regarding issues concerning the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Specifically, they declared that they will consult upon the following guidelines:

1. Not to assist, directly or indirectly, in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear-weapon State.
2. To promptly notify IAEA of the export to a non-nuclear-weapon State of any nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities and place them under IAEA safeguards.
3. To exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear facilities, technology, and weapons-usable material, and not export for peaceful purposes equipment, material, services or technology which could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons-usable material except when satisfied that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons or to any nuclear activity not subject to safeguards.
4. To not assist, directly or indirectly, in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of chemical weapons by any recipient whatsoever.
5. To not export equipment, materials, services, or technology which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of chemical weapons.
6. To strictly abide by the provision of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin, Weapons and on Their Destruction, undertake to maintain and support efforts for enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention and implement in earnest the confidence-building measures adopted by the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention.
7. Not to export equipment, material, services, or technology which could be used in the manufacture of biological weapons except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of biological weapons.
8. In considering whether to authorize the export for permitted purposes of the relevant items which might be of use in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, to take into account:
 - a) the capabilities, objectives, policies, and practices of the recipient, and any related proliferation concerns;
 - b) the significance and appropriateness of the items to be transferred;
 - c) an assessment of the proposed end-use, including relevant assurances by the government of the recipient State and controls on retransfer.
9. To maintain export control systems in accordance with their national laws or regulations to enable these guidelines to be effectively implemented.
10. To work together to increase the effectiveness of export controls pursuant to these guidelines.



The United States MX missile shown here is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which can carry up to 10 nuclear warheads.

New cuts in nuclear weapons

On 17 June, US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin reached an agreement to cut the number of strategic nuclear weapons to less than half the total permitted by the START Treaty.

In the START Treaty, which has yet to be ratified by both the US Senate and the Russian Parliament, the ceiling on strategic warheads is 8,556 for the USA and 6,500 for the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The new additional reductions in US and Russian missiles will provide for the elimination of all MIRVed land-based ICBMs by the year 2003. This elimination of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles of both countries will be implemented in two phases.

Within seven years of the START Treaty entering into force the total number of warheads for each side is to be reduced to between 3,800 and 4,250. This total, which is to be determined by each country, can include a total of 1,200 warheads on multiple warhead ICBM systems, 650 heavy ICBM warheads and 2,160 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads.

In the second phase of the reductions, the number of warheads is to be reduced to between 3,000 and 3,500 by the year 2003.

The total planned reductions could be completed by the year 2000 if the United States decides to contribute to the financing of the destruction or elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia.

For the first time Russia and the United States agreed on an actual rather than an artificial number for counting nuclear weapons carried by bombers. The number of warheads counted for bombers would be the number of nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to carry.

By the year 2003, or 2000, if possible, the number of SLBMs would be limited to 1,750, with the balance of the 3,000 to 3,500 for each side divided between land-based ICBMs and bombers as the parties choose.

Nordic statement on weapons of mass destruction

Meeting in Helsinki on 4-5 May, the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden issued a statement on "Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction".

Saying that the success of efforts to stop proliferation was a key factor in ensuring international peace and security, they expressed support for further strengthening multilateral cooperation in the field of export control.

They expressed their strong support for international treaties that ban or limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for international export control rules for missile technology and for products that might be used in the production of WMD.

They further emphasized that success should be achieved in negotiations between major weapons exporters and in the realization of the UN register on weapons transfers with regard to limiting and controlling international trade in conventional weapons.

Four of the Nordic countries are now members of the regime for dual-use nuclear products, the control regime for chemical and biological products and the control regime for missile technology (MTCR). Iceland is considering acceding to these regimes at an early date.

The Ministers welcomed the strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with the formal accession of China and South Africa and the announcement by France of its accession to the Treaty. The Ministers noted with particular pleasure that Estonia and Latvia had recently acceded to the NPT.

An agenda for peace

Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping is the subject of the report of the Secretary-General requested by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

Describing the changing context, the report states that with the end of the cold war there have been no Security Council vetoes since 31 May 1990 and that demands on the UN have surged. Its security arm has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace.

The report defines **preventive diplomacy** as action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Preventive diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior staff or specialized agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the General Assembly and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. It requires measures to create confidence and early warning based on information gathering and fact-finding, and may also involve preventive deployment and, in some cases, demilitarized zones.

The report asks regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the UN of the results. The Secretary-General will undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide.

Fact-finding is needed, the report states, initiated either by the Secretary-General, to enable him to meet his responsibilities under the Charter, or by the Security Council or the General Assembly. A formal fact-finding mission can, in addition to collecting information, help to defuse a dispute by its presence, indicating to the parties that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, is actively seized of the matter as a present or potential threat to international security.

Early warning networks developed by the UN system on environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease need to be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the UN to alleviate it. Regional arrangements and organizations have an important role in early warning.

Preventive deployment could take place in a variety of instances and ways. In conditions of national crisis, at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent, preventive deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence. Humanitarian assistance, impartially provided, could be of critical importance; assistance in maintaining security, whether through military, police or civilian personnel, could save lives and develop conditions of safety in which negotiations could be held.

In inter-State disputes preventive deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities.

Preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone. In each situation, the mandate and composition of the UN presence would need to be carefully devised and be clear to all.

Demilitarized zones should be considered as a form of preventive deployment, on both sides of a border, with the agreement of the two parties, as a means of separating potential belligerents, or on one side of the line, at the request of one party, for the purpose of removing any pretext for attack. Demilitarized zones would serve as symbols of the international community's concern that conflict be prevented.

Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter.

Mediation and negotiation can be undertaken by an individual designated by the Security Council, by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General.

The International Court of Justice remains an under-used resource for the peaceful adjudication of disputes; greater reliance on it would be an important contribution to UN peacemaking.

The Secretary-General then recommends the following steps to reinforce the role of the Court:

a) That all Member States should accept the general jurisdiction of the International Court under Article 36 of its Statute, without any reservation before the end of the UN Decade of International Law in the year 2000.

b) That the Chambers jurisdiction should be used when submission of a dispute to the full Court is not practical.

c) That States should support the Trust Fund to assist countries unable to afford the cost of bringing a dispute to the Court, and that such countries should take full advantage of the Fund in order to resolve their disputes.

Amelioration through assistance can contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes, as, for instance, by providing international assistance to displaced persons within a society. The UN agencies and programmes are exploring ways to improve this contribution.

Sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter would benefit if the Security Council would devise a set of measures involving the financial institutions and other components of the UN system to insulate States for which sanctions create special economic problems.

Action by military force, as provided for in Article 42 of the Charter now merits attention, the report states. Under this article, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security, the report states.

This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis. The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential



The UN Security Council during its January 1992 summit meeting (UN photo 179195)

aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response.

Peace-enforcement units under Article 43 could respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. The Council should consider the use of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service.

Such units would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General.

Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and, frequently, civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace, the report states.

Thirteen peace-keeping operations were established between 1945 and 1987, and 13 others since. An estimated 528,000 military, police and civilian personnel had served under the UN flag by the end of 1991.

Noting the contrast between the costs of UN peace-keeping and the costs of war, the report strongly supports proposals in some Member States for their peace-keeping contributions to be financed from defence, rather than from foreign affairs budgets.

The report recommends that arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peace-keeping personnel—civilian, police, or military—using the varied capabilities of Member State Government, of non-governmental organizations and the facilities of the Secretariat.

Since not all battalions have adequate equipment, the report says a pre-positioned stock of basic peace-keeping equipment should be established so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc., would be immediately available at the start of an operation.

Alternatively, Governments should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment, specified by the Secretary-General, on stand-by for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required. Member States in a position to do so should make air- and sea-lift capacity available to the United Nations free of cost or at lower than commercial rates.

Peace-building is also addressed in the report which defines it as action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Security Council acts on Somalia

As 500 UN peace-keepers prepared to go to Mogadishu, the technical team authorized by the Security Council returned from its visit to 11 major population centres throughout Somalia.

Based on a report of the team leader, the Secretary-General, in a report dated 24 August, recommended deployment of an additional 3,000 troops. The first two deployments of 750 troops would go to Bossaso and the south-west, where those concerned had already given their agreement.

This followed a 27 July meeting of the Security Council which asked the Secretary-General to promote an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia.

The terms of reference for the technical team were to examine:

- a) the possible monitoring of cease-fire arrangements in parts of the country other than Mogadishu;
- b) the possible deployment of military observers in the south-west region on Somalia's border with Kenya;
- c) the feasibility of an "arms for food" exchange programme with military personnel adequately armed and equipped for the task;
- d) the need for security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and personnel in other parts of the country;
- e) a possible role for the United Nations in assisting the re-establishment of local police forces.

The report states that the conflict in Somalia can only be resolved by the people of Somalia themselves in a process of national reconciliation. The objective of the United Nations is to undertake consultations and arrangements for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

Important progress had been made in consultations with Somali leaders and elders including discussions of alternative venues for the conference.

All political leaders and elders in Somalia have requested United Nations assistance in disarming the population and demobilizing the irregular forces. Such a programme has begun in some areas, such as Mogadishu-north and parts of the north-west and the north-east, on the initiative of the local leaders themselves. Some leaders prefer the arms to be destroyed while others suggest that they should be retained for the new regular forces which will be created.

Stressing the importance of continued enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by Security Council 733 (1992), the report states that the quantity of arms in the hands of individuals, factions and groups is enormous.

The complexity of the situation and the almost total absence of central, regional or local government, pose enormous operation difficulties for the United Nations in establishing a large-scale and effective presence, the report states.

None the less, the threat of mass starvation facing large segments of the population and the potential renewal of hostilities which could affect peace and stability throughout the Horn of Africa region require an immediate and comprehensive response.

Conventional arms registry update

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has now added "Transparency in armaments" to its agenda for 1992 and has agreed to address the item in a series of informal meetings.

In New York, on 17 July, the Panel of Technical Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms concluded its deliberations and adopted a consensus report.

The Register provides for the reporting of data on seven categories of offensive weapons considered most destabilizing for international security: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. Member States are also to provide background information on their legislation relating to arms transfers.

At a second stage, the Register is to be expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production. This issue will be dealt with by another group of experts to be convened in 1994.

The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs will implement the recommendations on the Register. It is in the process of establishing a computerized database which will process the information submitted by Governments for inclusion in the Register.

In reporting on the work of the Panel of Technical Experts, the UN spokesperson said that the Register is a ground-breaking, action-oriented tool which, by introducing openness and transparency into the field of arms transfers, can help to create an atmosphere conducive to actual measures of disarmament. By doing so, the Register provided a potential instrument for preventive diplomacy.

Cooperation on the environment in Kuwait

The United Nations Environment Programme has taken the initiative in making full use of the diverse capabilities of the UN system to respond to the environmental crisis resulting from the 1990/1991 hostilities in Kuwait.

A UN Inter-agency Plan of Action was developed in cooperation with the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME). The Member States in ROPME are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The main aim of the Plan was to:

- assess the environmental consequences of the war on the marine and coastal areas, atmosphere and terrestrial ecosystems;
- propose a programme for the mitigation of the adverse effects and for the rehabilitation and protection of the environment affected.

The marine and coastal environment assessment showed that:

- the Saudi coastline was the area most heavily affected by the estimated 6 million to 8 million barrels of oil spilled in the Persian Gulf waters;
- at least 30,000 marine birds perished, some 20% of the mangroves on the eastern Saudi coast were covered by oil and about 50% of the coral reefs were affected with lesser effects on the Iranian and Kuwaiti coasts;
- in addition to pollution from oil spills, fallout from the burning oil formed slicks on the surface of the water, releasing polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and heavy metal-laden soot particles into the water column.



Oil fields in Kuwait which were set ablaze by the Iraqi occupation forces (UN photo 158143/ J. Isaac)

Intensive UN efforts to assess the state of the marine environment led to launching a 100-day investigation of the ROPME area using the 231-foot research vessel, Mount Mitchell, of the United States Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The results of this expedition will provide a solid scientific basis for rehabilitation.

Initial assessments of the atmospheric pollution and long-term health effects in the region have shown that:

- air pollution resulting from more than 600 burning oil wells in Kuwait represented a potential hazard to human health;
- about 1 million to 2 million metric tons of carbon dioxide was formed daily by the plumes with the balance of the emissions in the form of non-methane organic vapours, carbon monoxide, organic particles, soot and sulfur dioxide.

The last of the 613 burning wells in Kuwait was put out on 6 November 1991. It is thus expected that the atmospheric conditions and air quality in Kuwait and the adjacent areas downwind will improve, although the long-term effects are still uncertain.

The smoke from the burning oil wells did not have any attributable effect on the weather or climate outside the Persian Gulf region because of its relatively low altitude and short residence time owing to capture by water vapour, the report states. There has also been no demonstrable influence on the Indian monsoon.

Terrestrial ecosystem effects identified in the report include:

- In Kuwait, the impact on soil and vegetation was serious, owing to the formation of huge oil pools with some lakes extending over vast areas of the desert with depths up to 1 metre or more; and the presence of land mines and unexploded ordnance and munitions still presents a hazard;
- A Kuwaiti study showed also that the oil pools led to a much higher level of hydrocarbons in the air, including toxic chemicals and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons;
- In Iraq, the military activities devastated large areas of the land and adversely affected the agricultural production and livestock of the country;
- In Saudi Arabia, the main terrestrial impact was due to the fallout of soot, particularly south of the Saudi/Kuwaiti border.

Investigation of alleged CW use in Mozambique

In an expert report sent to the Security Council in April regarding an incident in Mozambique on 16 January, the Secretary-General noted that the experts had observed that Mozambican government forces sustained casualties not entirely explicable by the kind of weapons so far in use in the conflict in Mozambique.

From the material available to the qualified expert mission it was not possible to determine whether or not a chemical weapon was used against Mozambican government forces.

The note by the Secretary-General containing the report states that the mere possibility that chemical weapons may be used in the armed conflict in Mozambique points to the urgency of finding a peaceful settlement. He expressed his sincere hope that the peace talks between the Mozambican Government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) would lead to a satisfactory solution as soon as possible.

The Mozambican government and RENAMO have since, on 7 August, signed a peace accord in Rome, to be complemented by a detailed agreement by 1 October.

The expert mission visited Mozambique from 23 to 27 March in order to collect and examine evidence from the incident of 16 January, and to interview those affected and medical personnel who had been involved in treating and/or examining them.

According to the generally consistent testimonies of soldiers present on 16 January, the Third Battalion of Commandos of the Mozambican government forces (some 300 to 400 troops), reinforced with one company of provincial troops, set out to attack a RENAMO base close to the South African border.

After several days travel, including two on foot, they reached the RENAMO camp. Sight of a white jeep-type vehicle was reported near the South African border and crossing into Mozambique, and also a light aircraft flying along the border.

After going several kilometres past the RENAMO base, the troops came under limited small-arms fire (no more than 15 shots). They took cover, and there was an explosion overhead producing dark smoke which then dissipated. There were no instantaneous casualties, and after a few minutes, the troops moved on.

After 15 minutes, complaints occurred, and there were problems keeping the soldiers moving. Many fell to the ground; some unable to get up, and some rising but unable to keep pace. The main body continued, but again found it necessary to stop. Some soldiers lay scattered along the route, and uncontrolled rifle firing broke out from time to time, from those lying down and from those on the move.

The earliest reported symptoms included a feeling of tremendous heat and severe thirst followed by profound muscular weakness. Confusion, disorientation, emotional instability and irrational behaviour occurred in many of the casualties.

The report of the expert mission states that the symptoms of the casualties were consistent with the use of an atropine-like chemical warfare agent, but also consistent with severe heat stress. It says it is improbable that a chemical attack would be planned using a single round, but that it cannot be excluded that a limited quantity of an agent would have had an effect which could have been exacerbated by local climatic conditions and limited water supply.

Investigation of alleged CW use in Azerbaijan

Following letters dated 1 June 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the UN Security Council and to the Secretary-General stating that the armed forces of Armenia had resorted to using chemical weapons, the Permanent Representative of Armenia requested that a group of competent experts be dispatched to the conflict zones to assess the situation.

The Secretary-General, under his own authority, appointed a mission of three qualified experts assisted by two members of the Secretariat to conduct an investigation in Azerbaijan from 4-7 July 1992.

The report of the mission concluded that all the events presented to the team as being suggestive of the involvement of the use of chemical weapons could also readily be explained by reasons other than chemical weapons. Furthermore, none of the events as described to the team agreed with any pattern that would be expected from an attack involving chemical weapons.

The team considered it unlikely that chemical warfare agents would have been used in such a way as to affect individuals, while not producing any clusters of contaminated casualties. Also, the fact that no individuals were presented who were free of conventional injury was not consistent with a CW attack.

It was noted that occasionally individuals may have reacted to chemical substances present in conventional weapons. At the same time, the report states, the Azerbaijani physicians clearly believed that some casualties of conventional weapon systems were also contaminated by chemical warfare agents.

Peaceful uses of outer space

Draft principles for the use of nuclear power in space were agreed by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which concluded its 1992 session on 26 June. The agreed principles, which had been developed over 13 years of debate, will be presented to the General Assembly in September.

When the Committee opened on 15 June, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, made a statement on the theme of International Space Year. He said that the theme, "Mission to Planet Earth," stressed the importance of understanding the Earth as a single, complex, interdependent system and of the unique role that space science and technology can play in promoting that understanding.

The global perspective from space allows the consistent, long-term monitoring of the global environment that is essential for directing and evaluating the actions we take to protect the environment and to ensure that our actions are effective.

Noting the wide range of organizations participating in International Space Year, including the International Astronautical Federation, the Committee on Space Research, the Space Agency Forum for International Space Year, and the United Nations, he said these bodies are collecting space observations and arranging for the analysis and interpretation of the data for the benefit of all countries.

In addition to the UN Space Applications Programme with ongoing educational and training activities, an international effort was under way to establish regional centres for space science and technology education in developing countries.



Ambassador Peter Hohenfellner (Austria), Chairman of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (centre), and Vladimir Petrovsky, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (left) made opening statements. (UN Photo 180027/M. Grant)

Mr. Petrovsky stressed environmental issues. He said the Framework Conventions on Climate Change and on Biological Diversity, which were opened for signature in Rio, and the efforts towards sustainable development under Agenda 21, will require more extensive use of space technology through international cooperation involving all countries.

Noting that the United Nations was being asked to take on new responsibilities for peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, Mr. Petrovsky said space technologies such as satellite communications and remote sensing can improve the capability of the UN. The new responsibilities include election supervision, crisis monitoring, refugee resettlement, cease-fire monitoring and redevelopment programmes in areas affected by destructive conflicts.

As the number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements has grown, so has the need for monitoring and verification, as well as for other confidence-building measures. Advanced space technologies offer a variety of techniques for monitoring and promoting compliance with arms limitation agreements, Mr. Petrovsky stated. Also, the conversion of military space technology to civilian applications could serve as a model for the conversion of other military capabilities.

The principles agreed by the Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space include guidelines

and criteria for the safe use of nuclear power sources in outer space. This use is to be restricted to space missions which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources.

General goals for radiation protection and nuclear safety are stated. The design and use of space objects with nuclear power sources on board shall ensure, with a high degree of confidence, that the hazards are kept below acceptable levels which the guidelines define.

Nuclear reactors may be operated on interplanetary missions in sufficiently high orbits, as defined by the guidelines, and in low-Earth orbits if they are stored in sufficiently high orbits after the operational part of their mission.

A sufficiently high orbit is one in which the orbital lifetime is long enough to allow for decay of the fission products, and must be such that the risks to existing and future outer space missions and of collision with other space objects are kept to a minimum. Nuclear reactors in space shall use only highly enriched uranium 235 as fuel, and the design shall take into account the radioactive decay of the fission and activation products.

Any State launching a space object with nuclear power sources on board shall, in the event this space object is malfunctioning with a risk of re-entry of radioactive materials to the Earth, inform States concerned and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the guidelines state.

Update on Cambodia

On 14 August, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cambodia signed the United Nations Electoral Law for Cambodia, 1992. As required under the Paris Agreements of October 1991, the content of the Law was determined in consultation with the country's Supreme National Council.

The Electoral Law now defines a Cambodian qualified to register to vote as someone 18 or over born in Cambodia, with a mother or father born in Cambodia, or a person born outside Cambodia with a mother or father born in Cambodia, whose own mother or father was also born in Cambodia.

The Electoral Law prohibits the use of portraits of Prince Norodom Sihanouk or Angkor Wat as symbols of any political party. It specifies that voting facilities will be provided for overseas voters in Europe, North America and Australia, although registration of voters is to take place exclusively in Cambodia.

Japan decides to support UN peace-keeping

In June, the lower house of the Japanese Parliament gave final approval to the Peacekeeping Operation Bill which permits up to 2,000 Japanese troops to take part in United Nations peace-keeping operations and in international humanitarian relief operations.

According to the new Japanese law, the Government of Japan is to participate in UN international peace-cooperation assignments only when consent is obtained from the parties to the conflict and the host countries involved in the specific undertaking.



When the Security Council approved the establishment of a \$1.9 billion peace-keeping operation in Cambodia involving some 22,000 troops, police officers and civilian administrators, Ambassador Yoshio Hatano of Japan addressed the Council (UN Photo 179407/ M. Tzovaras)

On 21 July, the Security Council had expressed deep concern at the difficulties met by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in implementing the Paris Agreements, and underlined that all signatories to those Agreements were bound by all their obligations.

The Council strongly deplored the continuing refusal of one of the parties to the Agreements, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), to permit the deployment of all components of UNTAC to the areas under its control, and demanded that the PDK permit such deployment without delay and implement fully Phase II of the cease-fire plan and other aspects of the Paris Agreements.

The Council acted by unanimously adopting resolution 766 (1992) which reaffirmed the international community's firm

commitment to a process under which UNTAC, operating freely throughout all of Cambodia as authorized by the Paris Agreements, could verify the departure of all foreign forces and ensure full implementation of the agreements.

The resolution approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and invited them to accelerate the deployment of UNTAC's civilian components, especially those mandated to supervise or control the existing administrative structures.

It also requested the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to ensure that international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia would from now on only benefit the parties that are fulfilling their obligations under the Paris Agreements and cooperating fully with UNTAC.

Japan would then contribute units of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, staff from the Crew of the Japan Maritime Safety Agency, and recruits from relevant administrative agencies, local government authorities and the private sector.

All personnel identified to take part in the implementation of international peace-cooperation assignments would belong to the International Peace Cooperation Corps (IPCC), a governmental body created by the new law for the purpose of implementing

international peace-cooperation assignments. The IPCC will be established within the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, who will be the chief directly in charge of it.

The new Japanese law stipulates that the IPCC will undertake its assignments in accordance with an implementation plan and operational procedures made in conformity with the decisions of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or persons acting with his authority in the field.

Peace-keeping in Western Sahara

The necessity of maintaining the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to monitor the cease-fire was reaffirmed by the Security Council in June, and the Secretary-General was asked for a progress report at a later date.

On 20 August, the Secretary-General reported a marked decline in the number of cease-fire violations confirmed by MINURSO, with 6 violations in the June-August period compared to 102 in the March-May period; and no incidents of intentional hostility resulting in casualties on either side.

While recognizing that the main obstacle to holding a referendum concerned disagreements over criteria for voting eligibility, the parties agreed that their talks would initially focus on the formulation of safeguards to protect the

political, economic, social and other rights and liberties of the losing side in the referendum, whatever the outcome.

The Frente POLISARIO defined two sets of safeguards. In the event of a victory in the referendum, it would govern on the basis of democratic freedoms and would establish the fullest possible economic cooperation with Morocco, bilaterally and in the Arab Maghreb Union framework. Should the integration option prevail, the POLISARIO would ask the Government of Morocco to guarantee freedom from any form of political persecution or discrimination and to allow free emigration.

Morocco's offers and proposals for safeguards also addressed both the eventuality of integration and that of independence. In the case of Western Sahara's integra-

tion with Morocco, the guarantees sought by the POLISARIO would be forthcoming and a general amnesty and pardon would be declared. Conversely, Morocco has undertaken to honour all national and international undertakings.

Recent reports that the Government of Morocco planned to hold municipal and legislative elections and a plebiscite on constitutional reform led the UN Secretary-General to inquire as to whether the intended elections should not be postponed until after the United Nations Referendum.

While reluctant to postpone, the Government of Morocco has expressed readiness to give a written commitment that it will abide by the results of the UN Referendum.

UN Angola Verification Mission II

On 31 July, which was the initial closing date for the registration of voters for the Angolan elections due to take place on 29 and 30 September, the National Electoral Council announced that 4,303,000 voters had been registered as compared with a target of 4 million earlier set for that date.

The Council estimated that about 1 million more eligible voters had yet to register, and extended the period to 10 August. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola, Margaret J. Anstee, has described the registration results as quite remarkable, given the enormous constraints of transport, communication and other vital logistical support in a country ravaged by 30 years of continuous strife.

Three representatives of the observer countries to the Angolan Peace Accords visited Luanda late in July: Jose Durao Barroso,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal; Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs of the United States; and Ambassador Karasin of the Russian Federation.

Both they and the Special Representative have stressed that many problems still must be resolved to ensure an atmosphere conducive to peaceful elections and to foster national reconciliation and a stable political climate. Not least among these are the rapid demobilization of the rival armies and the formation of a single, unified armed force, so that only one army, made up of recruits from both sides, will be in existence at the time of the elections.

In anticipation of the general elections in Angola, the Secretary-General had been asked to ensure the participation of the United

Nations in verifying the implementation of the plans of May 1991. These plans, signed by the Minister for External Relations of Angola and by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), were prepared in conjunction with the Peace Accords of May 1991.

In March 1992, the Security Council decided that the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) should be enlarged to include an electoral division. It was thus entrusted with verifying and observing all activities related to the registration of voters and the subsequent election, as well as the counting, computation and announcement of its results.

UNAVEM was established by the Security Council in 1988 to verify the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

India and Pakistan hold talks

The question of nuclear non-proliferation and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction was addressed during three days of talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, Mr. J. N. Dixit of India and Mr. Shahryar M. Khan of Pakistan.

The two foreign secretaries exchanged the instruments of ratification of their agreement on prevention of air space violations by military aircraft and their agreement on advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements.

The two parties also signed a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and on their code of conduct for treatment of diplomatic/consular personnel in India and Pakistan.

They also discussed issues relating to the banning of weapons of mass destruction, and agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on biological weapons.

Regional security and ASEAN

At its meeting in Manila, Philippines, from 25 to 26 June, senior officials of the six member States of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) included defence delegates for the first time.

They also addressed the possibility of preparing a treaty for a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Formed in 1967 as a regional forum for economic and political cooperation, ASEAN now consists of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines.

NATO to accept peace-keeping mandates

Meeting in Oslo, Norway, on 4-5 June, the Foreign Ministers of the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a communiqué on a potential new role for NATO.

"The alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes", the communiqué stated.

It went on to say that NATO was "prepared to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peace-keeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available alliance resources and expertise".

Speaking at Annapolis on 18 June, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Manfred Wörner, referred to the decision in Oslo as a major breakthrough towards the objective of contributing NATO's experience and expertise to the management of a Euro-Atlantic order of peace. The Alliance would now be able to support peace-keeping operations under the responsibility of the CSCE.

This would be done on a case by case basis and would not preclude the participation of other CSCE member States in such operations, he stated. In the weeks ahead, the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, would have the job of addressing the practical options and modalities by which the Alliance's support to CSCE peacekeeping operations could best be provided.

WEU plans peace-keeping system

On 19 June the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the nine member States of the Western European Union (WEU) agreed to equip it with its own conventional troops for humanitarian and peace-keeping operations.

Taking account of the newly established CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, WEU acted to enhance its capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes.

In a declaration of 19 June, referred to as the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU Ministers stated that the CSCE should have the authority to initiate and pursue peace-keeping operations under its own responsibility. Thus military units of the WEU member States could, with the authority of WEU, be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, and for peace-keeping, peacemaking and crisis-management operation.

Any decisions to use military units answerable to WEU are to be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The decision to institute this procedure follows examination of ways to strengthen the operational role of WEU as the defence component of the European Community.

The military units to be used in WEU operations are to be drawn from the forces of WEU member States, including, after consultation with NATO, forces assigned to NATO missions.

A planning office will be established at the WEU Secretariat in Brussels on 1 October 1992 with Maj. Gen. Caltabiano as its first Director.

Helsinki Document 1992

On 9 and 10 July 1992, leaders of most of the 52 States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe met in Helsinki to strengthen the institutions and structures established by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 1990.

"Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges of Change" is the title of the paper which emerged from the July meeting. Among the commitments described in it is a decision to start a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building.

The participating States decided to enhance regular consultation and to intensify cooperation among themselves on matters related to security, and to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict.

To carry out these tasks they decided to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, with a strengthened Conflict Prevention Centre.

They undertook to ensure that their efforts in the Forum towards arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, security cooperation and conflict prevention would be coherent, interrelated and complementary.

The objectives of the Forum for Security Cooperation include:

- To strengthen security and stability through the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping or achieving the levels of armed forces to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond. These new measures may entail reductions of and limitations on conventional armed forces and may, as appropriate, include measures of a regional character.

- To address the question of the harmonization of obligations agreed among participating States under the various existing instruments concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building.
- To negotiate new stabilizing measures in respect of military forces and new confidence- and security-building measures designed to ensure greater transparency in the military field.

The participating States also undertook to support and enhance regimes on non-proliferation and on arms transfers and to enhance contacts, liaison, exchanges and cooperation between their armed forces.

They will also promote consultation and cooperation in respect of challenges to their security from outside their territories.

The negotiations on new measures of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building will proceed in distinct phases, taking into account progress made in the implementation of existing arms control agreements. They will also take into consideration ongoing reduction, restructuring and redeployment processes regarding armed forces as well as further relevant political and military developments.

Paragraph 25 of the text concerning the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation states that all measures negotiated in the Forum will be developed in a way which precludes circumvention.

A programme for immediate action is set out in the Helsinki Document 1992. The participating States undertake to give early attention to various issues, which include:

- Arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building in the territory of the participating States in Europe or in Asia as defined in relation to the area of application of each measure.
- Appropriate harmonization of the obligations of participating States under existing international instruments applicable to conventional armed forces in Europe, in particular concerning the exchange of information, verification and force levels.
- The negotiation of new stabilizing measures and confidence-building measures related to conventional armed forces to apply within the area of application set out in the Vienna Document 1992.
- The negotiation of further transparency by means of a global annual exchange of information encompassing armaments and equipment, including categories limited by the CFE Treaty.
- Cooperation for strengthening multilateral non-proliferation regimes, including the transfer of sensitive expertise, and the establishment of a responsible approach to international armaments transfers.
- Elaboration of provisions to provide transparency about the intentions of each CSCE State regarding the size, structure, training and equipment of its armed forces, defence policy, doctrines and budgets.
- The development of a programme of exchanges, cooperation and the sharing of expertise in the field of defence conversion throughout all the territory of the participating States.

NGO news items

The brief report below on activities of non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes which have come to the attention of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The choice of events does not imply any judgement of them by the United Nations.

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) held its 11th World Congress in September 1993 in Mexico City. The theme was "Peace, Justice, and Health in a Changing World". The Congress President, Dr. Manuel Velasco-Suárez, speaking for the host organization, Mexican Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, said the Congress was organized to help participants grapple with the consequences of recent nuclear and military policies on development and peace throughout the world. **Contact:** IPPNW, 1993 Congress, 126 Rogers St., Cambridge, MA 02142-1096 USA.

The Union Pacifiste de France presented two letters addressed to the Secretary-General to an official of the Office for Disarmament Affairs on 27 July 1992. One letter stressed the importance of general and complete disarmament which the Union Pacifiste states can only be achieved if one nation sets an example as it proposes should be done by France. The other letter requested the United Nations to remind States Members of the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights of 10 March 1987 on the recognition of conscientious objection and the possibility of offering civilian service as an alternative to military service. **Contact:** Union Pacifiste de France, 4, rue Lazare-Hoche, 92100 Boulogne, France. (Tel: 33 46 03 27 62)

The Peace Research Centre in Canberra, Australia, and the Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies in Nedlands, Western Australia, held a conference in late June on Arms Control in the Post-Cold-War World. Part of the programme took place in Canberra from 25 to 26 June, and part in Perth from 29 to 30 June. Topics covered included: The new world order and arms control; Nuclear deterrence: where are we now?; Implications of the Soviet implosion; The verification revolution; Biological weapons; Strategic nuclear (and space) arms control and disarmament; Nuclear non-proliferation; Missile control; Nuclear testing; Conventional arms control; Confidence- and security-building measures; Naval arms control; and a concluding session on the implications for the Asia-Pacific region in the Canberra programme; and on the implications for the Indian Ocean region in the Perth programme. **Contact:** Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia, or Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, GPO Box 4, Canberra, ACT 2601. (Tel: 06 249 3754/3098, Fax: 06 249 0174)

The Association for Non-proliferation was set up in Moscow on 27 March with the goal of promoting non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Its aim is to coordinate the activities of experts on non-proliferation and related issues in academic, governmental and industrial circles. **Contact:** Dr. Andrei V. Zagorsky, 76 Vernadsky Street, Moscow 117454, Russia.

The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) Core Group held a seminar on "The New Europe and Nuclear Non-Proliferation" from 23 to 24 May in Germany. The seminar addressed three topics: The Non-Proliferation Regime and European Security; Peaceful Nuclear Activities and Europe; and A Common European Non-Proliferation Strategy. The meeting was organized in conjunction with the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt (PRIF). **Contact:** Ben Sanders, 240 East 27th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016, USA. (Tel: 1 212 532 3153; Fax: 1 212 532 9847).

The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies will be host to the twelfth PPNN Core Group meeting from 27–29 November 1992 at the Keidanren Guest House, Sunto-gun, Shizuoko Prefecture, Japan. This meeting will examine the interrelationships between the global nuclear non-proliferation system and non-proliferation issues in the East Asian region. **Contact:** Michael Pugh, Programme Director, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, Southampton SO9 5NH, England.

The Non-Governmental Organizations and Institutional Relations Section of the United Nations held its Annual Conference for NGOs at UN Headquarters in New York from 9–11 September 1992. The theme was on "Regional Conflicts: Threats to World Peace and Progress". The conference allowed NGO representatives and other participants to examine the role of the UN in resolving conflicts and maintaining world peace. **Contact:** NGO Resource Centre, United Nations, New York, NY 19917, USA. (Tel: 1 212 963 7234; Fax: 963 6914).